Welfare Economics and Giving for Development by Atkinson, Tony
 
 
WELFARE ECONOMICS AND GIVING FOR DEVELOPMENT 
 
TONY ATKINSON 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The economics of welfare is at the heart of economics, but in recent decades welfare economics 
has been relegated to the sidelines. While economists routinely make policy recommendations, or 
statements about economic success or failure, they often do so without apparent awareness of the 
ethical foundations for their conclusions. Yet, the foundations for welfare economics are far from 
solid. The standard formulation imposes severe constraints on the information that is taken into 
account when making evaluative judgments.  The adoption of a welfarist social welfare function 
rules out any information other than individual welfare. In this paper, I consider the implications 
for welfare economics of one specific issue: individual giving for world development. While 
giving for development is modest in total amount, it is one of the few direct ways in which 
individuals reveal information relevant to the properties of the social welfare function to be 
applied to global redistribution.  I begin by examining individual motives for giving, arguing that 
giving for the specific purpose of development cannot be adequately explained by the standard 
models of “warm glow” or “public goods”.  An alternative is proposed, where people “frame” 
their giving in a way that gives meaning to their individual contribution.  This alternative may 
well take a non-welfarist form. I go on to consider the implications for the social welfare 
function. What are the implications, if any, for the social welfare function of individual altruism 
towards people in poor countries?  Finally, I address explicitly the geographical dimension, and 
the fact that the social welfare is a national social welfare function, which has to take into account 
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Introduction 
 
  The economics of welfare is at the heart of economics. We study economics, 
not so much for its aesthetic qualities or intrinsic interest, as for what it allows us to 
say about the state of society and about the case for policy choices. The study of such 
evaluative judgments should be central to the teaching of economics. However, in 
recent decades welfare economics has been relegated to the sidelines. While 
economists routinely make policy recommendations, or statements about economic 
success or failure, they often do so without apparent awareness of the ethical 
foundations for their conclusions. Economists use national income as a criterion for 
judging economic performance, or apply cost-benefit analysis, without considering 
the extent to which these rest on unstated assumptions. It is taken for granted that 
standard welfare economics provides an evaluative machinery and can answer all 
questions. 
 
  Yet, the foundations for welfare economics are far from solid. Welfare 
economics is in need, not just of oxygen, but of a make-over.  As Amartya Sen has 
argued forcefully for many years, the standard formulation imposes severe constraints 
on the information that is taken into account when making evaluative judgments. As 
he observes in Sen (1979), public policy is conventionally assessed according to a 
“social welfare function”, where this function is “welfarist” in the sense that social 
welfare depends only on the well-being of individuals.  The adoption of a welfarist 
social welfare function rules out any information other than individual welfare. There 
is for example no room for direct concern with hunger or homelessness; there is no 
room for minimum rights. When combined with the further assumption that the social 
welfare function is non-decreasing in individual levels of welfare (Pareto preference), 
standard welfare economics allows no place for the kind of concerns about the 
“distance” between members of a society expressed by Plato or Tawney. 
 
  Sen has engaged in a full frontal assault on the edifice of standard welfare 
economics. In this paper, I adopt a different tactic.  I take one concrete issue and 
consider its implications for welfare economics. The issue that I have chosen, as 
indicated by the title, is that of individual giving, specifically for world development. 
                                                 
1 Chapter for Welfare, Development, Philosophy and Social Science: Essays for Amartya Sen’s 75
th 
Birthday, Volume I: Welfare Economics, edited by Kaushik Basu and Ravi Kanbur. The first version 
was prepared for the Workshop at the Official Launch of the Oxford Poverty and Human Development 
Initiative, 31 May 2007 at Queen Elizabeth House, and I thank the participants for their comments. The 
research was supported by ESRC project grant “Giving to Development” (RES-155-25-0061), which 
forms part of the Non-Governmental Public Action programme. The project is being conducted in 
conjunction with John Micklewright, Cathy Pharoah and Sylke Schnepf. I am most grateful to them for 
discussion and suggestions, but they are not to be held responsible for the views expressed.     2
While giving for development is modest in total amount, it is one of the few direct 
ways in which individuals reveal information relevant to the properties of the social 
welfare function to be applied to global redistribution.  Where individuals themselves 
express concerns about the distribution of resources, where they are willing to make 
transfers, how should this be taken into account in the social welfare function?  If 
individuals are non-welfarist in their concerns, should the state continue to adopt a 
welfarist social welfare function? In the first section (Section 1), I examine individual 
motives for giving, turning to the specific purpose of development in the second 
section.  I then consider in Section 3 how far these motives are welfarist. In the fourth 
section, I go on to the implications for the social welfare function. What are the 
implications, if any, for the social welfare function of individual altruism towards 
people in poor countries?  Finally, in Section 5, I address explicitly the geographical 
dimension, and the fact that the social welfare is a national social welfare function, 
which has to take into account the limited “sphere of control” of national 
governments.  
 
 
1. Individual Motives for Giving 
 
  Individual transfers have been incorporated into standard welfare economics, 
via consideration of utility interdependence (as in Arrow, 1981). This is usually 
attributed to a series of contributions in 1969: Hochman and Rodgers (1969), Kolm 
(1969), and Winter (1969). But utility interdependence has long formed part of 
welfare economics (see for example, Graaff, 1963, Chapter 4), and indeed my starting 
point is Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics of 1881.
2  For Edgeworth, it was evident 
that individuals had some degree of concern for others: 
“between the frozen pole of egoism and the tropical expanse of utilitarianism 
[there is] the position of one for whom in a calm moment his neighbour’s utility 
compared with his own neither counts for nothing, nor ‘counts for one’, but 
counts for a fraction” (1881, page 102).  
Such a notion does of course long pre-date Edgeworth. In The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, published in 1759, Adam Smith had written that “every man feels his own 
pleasures and his own pains more sensibly than those of other people. The former are 
original sensations – the latter the reflected or sympathetic images of those 
sensations” (1976, page 359). He goes on to consider the principles “that direct the 
order in which individuals are recommended to our beneficence” (1976, page 372).  
 
  Setting the position out formally, if, for person i out of 1 to n, we write 
individual welfare as ui, and individual i’s objective function as Ui, then the individual 
is concerned with 
 
 U i = ui + λi ∑j≠i uj/ ( n - 1 )       ( 1 )  
 
where 0≤λi<1. λi is the fraction posited by Edgeworth, and it is assumed, for the 
moment, that a person is equally concerned with all his or her neighbours (I discuss 
below the Smithian question of the order in which individuals are “recommended to 
our beneficence”).  This formulation is similar to that adopted by Sen (1966) in his 
                                                 
2 I owe this to Collard (1975), who provides a very informative account of Edgeworth’s treatment and 
its relation to more recent literature (which typically neglects Edgeworth).   3
analysis of the allocation of labour in a co-operative enterprise where families are not 
necessarily indifferent to the happiness of others. In (1), the person i is assumed to be 
concerned with his or her own welfare and, to a lesser extent, with the average 
welfare of others. Or, rewriting equation (1), the person is concerned with a weighted 
combination of own welfare and the average welfare of society:  
 
Ui = ui [1- λi /(n-1)]+ λi [n/(n-1)] ∑j uj/n       (2) 
 
If the individual objective function takes the form described above, what form 
should the social welfare function take? One key issue is the way in which differences 
between individuals are treated – the principles of equity – but here I put this on one 
side, assuming that social welfare is the simple sum of individual welfares. I do this to 
focus on a second key issue – is social welfare a sum of Ui or ui?  This may not 
matter.  As is observed by Sen (1966), where people have the same values of λ, 
maximisation of the utilitarian social welfare function ∑Ui is the same as maximising 
∑ui. But this ceases to be true if people do not treat their fellow citizens 
symmetrically. And when, as in the next section, we consider giving for development, 
asymmetry is an essential part of the story. 
 
 
2. Giving for Development 
 
  A person with an objective such as (1) or (2) can be expected to make 
transfers, where these are feasible, towards others who are regarded as more deserving 
and whose greater deservingness outweighs the discount implied by λi being less than 
1. Motives may however be more circumscribed. The donor may be concerned, not 
with all his or her neighbours, but with only those who are disadvantaged.  The sum in 
the second term may be limited to those below a poverty line, and those better off 
may get zero weight. (In the same way, the disadvantaged may not have reciprocal 
concern for the donors.)  The notion of giving “for development” does indeed imply 
that the objective is restricted in this kind of way.   
 
We could go even further and say that the donor has no specific concern with 
the individual recipients at all. Rather, as has been discussed in the literature on 
philanthropy (see the survey by Andreoni, 2006), the donor derives a “warm glow” 
from the act of making the gift. He or she “feels good” about aiding development or 
about relieving disaster. In the objective function, the second term is then simply a 
function of the amount of the gift. Such warm glow giving behaviour can readily be 
incorporated into standard welfare economics as a consumption externality.  
  
  The warm glow assumption might be sufficient to explain a general 
disposition to make charitable gifts but does not seem to capture all that lies behind 
giving for the specific purposes of development (Atkinson, 2007).  It may explain 
why people make regular monthly payments to the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF)
3 
but not why they send their CAF cheques to Oxfam rather than cancer relief. The 
main alternative assumption in the literature is that donors are concerned with the end 
outcome, where this takes on characteristics of a “public good”. If we modify the 
                                                 
3 Individuals in the UK can make regular payments into a CAF account (to which is added the gift aid 
tax refund) and then decide, by writing CAF cheques, how the charitable gifts are to be allocated.    4
earlier formulation (1) to focus on the set D of disadvantaged, with d members, and 
we introduce explicitly the gift gi by person i, then, taking income, y, as the sole 
argument of the utility function, the objective of person i becomes   
 
 U i = u(yi-gi)+ λi /d ∑jεD u[yj+(gi+Σ
-)/d]      (3) 
 
The well-being of the recipients depends on their initial income, yj,
4 and on the total 
of transfers divided by the number of recipients. The total of transfers is equal to i’s 
transfer plus those made by all other donors, denoted by Σ
-.  
 
This brings us to a second important feature of giving for development: the 
large number of potential recipients. We are not talking about a small number of 
neighbours but about millions of potential beneficiaries. We then encounter the 
problem that, as d becomes large, the marginal contribution of any individual donor 
tends to zero. Whatever the value of λi, there is a value of d large enough to reduce the 
marginal value of an individual contribution below the cost in terms of reduced 
personal income.
5  This gives rise to the standard free-riding problem: the individual 
donor has no personal incentive to contribute. 
 
  The warm glow assumption and the public goods assumption may apply in 
other contexts, but neither seems to capture adequately the motives for giving for 
development. We need, in my view, an alternative formulation.  The framing of the 
problem suggested here is that the donor is assumed to be concerned with the impact 
on the living standards of the recipients; it is not enough simply to put the cheque in 
the envelope. But the donor does not regard the cheque as being divided among 
millions of recipients. The donor is assumed to “identify” with the situation of 
recipients on a one-to-one (or one-to-m, where m is a small number) basis. This may 
be formalised as follows 
 
 U i = u(yi-gi) + λi v[(yr+gi)]       (4) 
 
where r denotes the representative recipient(s) envisaged by the donor, assumed to 
receive the whole gift.
6 As written, the donor ignores the contributions of other 
private donors; it is assumed that they are helping other recipients. The donor wishes 
to make “a real difference” to the people he or she is helping, in contrast to the 
“spreading out” that would be indicated by measures of diminishing marginal utility.  
 
The “framing” assumption embodied in (4) is no more than a hypothesis, but it 
is coherent with a number of features of present charitable activity in the development 
field.  Such an assumption is indeed made concrete in aid programmes where donors 
“adopt” families or villages, to whom the transfer is channelled. Even where there is 
no explicit adoption, the information supplied by charities is often designed to help 
donors to identify with the situation of individual recipients. Moreover, charitable 
                                                 
4 Here I am ignoring any differences in needs arising from differing family size, etc. 
5 The dilution by d would not apply if the objective function were written in terms of the sum of the 
welfares of recipients, but in this case, as d becomes large, so does the second term: the individual’s 
own welfare would become entirely subsidiary. This does not seem a reasonable way to model 
individual giving behaviour. 
6 Issues of leakage (for example, through administrative costs or corruption) are not considered here, 
but are discussed in Atkinson (2007).    5
agencies concentrate their activities, rather than spreading their efforts over all 
potential receipients. Even large charities like Oxfam have projects in a relatively 
small number of places. 
 
 
3. Is Giving Welfarist? 
  
  I now assume that the motives for individual giving are those represented by 
the “framing” formulation (4).  Such outcome-oriented giving could be welfarist, in 
the sense that the function v[] could represent the welfare of the recipients. We would 
then be returning to a formulation like (1), except that in the second term the average 
welfare of others would be replaced by the welfare of the representative recipient.  
Revealed preference however suggests that donors are concerned less with achieved 
welfare and more with the resources to which a person has access. Donors are moved 
by the fact that people are living on less than $1 a day, and this is the form adopted by 
governments in the Millennium Development Goals. An income of $1 may be 
associated with different levels of welfare for the recipient depending on the 
circumstances: for example, how many hours of labour are required. The person may 
have to work long hours, or in unsatisfactory conditions, but these seem typically to 
be regarded as second-order considerations. Priority is given to ensuring an income of 
$1 a day, and this is a non-welfarist objective.
7 We can encompass this motive for 
giving by subtracting a function, f[], of the poverty gap of the representative recipient  
 
 U i = u(yi-gi) - λi f[π -yr-gi]       (5) 
 
where π is the poverty line, and people differ in the weight (λi) that they attach to 
reducing poverty. The function f[] is assumed to be increasing and to satisfy f[0]=0; 
its other properties may be influenced by the considerations discussed in Sen (1976).   
 
  Concern with an income poverty measure would represent one form of non-
welfarist objective, but it is not the only one possible. The function v[] may contain a 
range of arguments. As has been stressed by many development economists and by 
the World Bank, deprivation is multi-dimensional. The Millennium Development 
Goals refer to hunger, to ensuring primary education, to reducing mortality, to 
limiting the spread of disease, and to the provision of safe drinking water. In 
evaluating progress towards these goals, we have a multi-dimensional scorecard. But, 
in order to make decisions, we have to balance one against another. As a guide to 
action, an incomplete ordering may not be sufficient. An individual donor has to 
allocate charitable donations between different uses, such as famine relief, long-term 
development aid, and safe water. 
 
  In balancing these different variables, the donor may be attracted by the notion 
of “capabilities” introduced by Sen (1980) as an alternative to the welfarist approach. 
Capabilities refer to the capacity of a person to do certain basic things. Sen used the 
example of a bicycle, which provides a person with the capability of transportation 
over a certain radius (and may, for instance, allow the owner to search for work). It is 
not the utility generated by ownership of the bicycle that is relevant; indeed, the 
                                                 
7 The implications of such a non-welfarist objective for public policy have been examined by Kanbur, 
Keen and Tuomala (1994); see also Kanbur, Pirttilä and Tuomala (2006).   6
bicycle may not in fact be used because it is considered undignified. Moreover, it is 
the set of options that is relevant, which raises the issue, discussed in Sen (1985), of 
the evaluation of such a set. At the level of the individual donor, however, a choice 
from such a set must be made. The donor, in entering different capabilities into the 
function v[], is in effect prioritising the different dimensions. This remains the case, at 
one remove, if the gift is made to a non-governmental organisation, since the donor is 
choosing between different charitable agencies.   
 
 
4. The Social Welfare Function with Giving 
 
  The objective function of the individual donor, person i, has been represented 
as possessing two elements, Ui = ui + λi v[], where ui is the individual utility and λiv[] 
embodies the concern of person i for the disadvantaged. We now wish to form a social 
welfare function that aggregates the objectives of all citizens, i = 1, …, n. Such a 
national social welfare function is necessary, among other reasons, to evaluate public 
policy towards individual giving. For example, should there be a deduction against 
taxable income?  The tax treatment of charitable contributions has been much 
discussed: see Vickrey (1962), Atkinson (1976) and Diamond (2006). A national 
social welfare function is equally necessary to guide policy towards giving by the 
state in the form of Official Development Assistance.  It should be noted that I focus 
here on a national social welfare function for a country of donors to recipients who 
are overseas (and therefore not included in the list of citizens i = 1, …, n).  There will 
of course also be donors within the countries in which the recipients live.  
 
  How should the two elements enter the social welfare function? Different 
positions have been taken. The first position is simple: the social welfare function 
aggregates individual utilities, ui, and ignores λiv[] completely. This has obvious 
appeal in certain situations. If the second element captured negative feelings towards 
others, then we would have little hesitation in ignoring such feelings of jealousy. Sir 
Dennis Robertson dismissed such elements vigorously. Referring to the possibility 
that the existence of envy might make it impossible to say social welfare had 
increased even if everyone had more of everything, he said that we should “call in the 
Archbishop of Canterbury to smack people over the head if they are stupid enough to 
allow the increased happiness … to be eroded by the gnawings of the green-eyed 
monster” (1954, page 678).  
 
But there are also those who argue that we should ignore λiv[] where the 
feelings are positive. In his recent discussion of warm glow preferences for giving for 
public goods, Diamond notes that “the fact that warm glows improve the description 
of individual behaviour does not necessarily imply that social welfare should be 
defined including warm glows” (2006, page 915).  In part, his counter-arguments are 
specific to the warm glow formulation, treating it as a concern with process rather 
than outcome, whereas here I have adopted an outcome interpretation of giving for 
development. But in terms of outcomes, too, Diamond concludes that “inclusion of 
warm glow preferences calls for using resources to give people warm glows. 
Somehow this does not seem like a good use of resources” (2006, page 917). In part, 
this stems from the view that warm glow arises from decreasing the negative feelings 
associated with social pressure to donate. I agree that this form of interdependence 
raises interesting wider issues for welfare economics, but there are also those who   7
give independently of social pressures, so that this cannot be the whole story. In part, 
his argument, drawing on Hammond (1987), is that inclusion of warm glow motives 
is double counting, since enjoyment of the public good by others is already included 
in the social welfare function. In the present case, however, there is no double 
counting since the recipients are assumed to be in a different country. The only way in 
which they can enter is via the term λiv[]. 
 
  In the case of giving for development, therefore, we cannot, in my view, 
simply dismiss the concerns expressed by individuals (the term λiv[]).  One 
consequence is that the social welfare function could well become non-welfarist. As 
argued earlier, donors may well be concerned with income poverty irrespective of 
other circumstances, such as hours of work. In that case, a social welfare function 
formed by summing the individual objective functions
8 would be Σui minus a function 
of the representative poverty gap weighted by the average value of λ. If the concerns 
of donors are multi-dimensional, or are based on capabilities, the inclusion of the 
terms λiv[] will modify the social welfare function more radically. 
 
  This brings me to a more fundamental issue. If individuals evaluate the 
outcome of giving in a non-welfarist manner, should this not affect the way in which 
we form the social welfare function?  If individuals are concerned with development 
in terms of capabilities, then we have to consider why we are evaluating the 
performance of our own society in a different way (aggregating individual welfares). 
One response may be to say that individual giving is a minor part of economic activity 
(in 2005/2006 the average amount given per head in the UK was £2.04 a month 
(NCVO and CAF, 2006, page 29)). The tail would be wagging the dog.  But 
individual giving is one of the few direct ways in which individuals reveal 
information relevant to the properties of the social welfare function, and this 
information should not be simply dismissed.    
 
 
5. Spheres of Control and Giving by Individuals and by Nations 
 
  If the government of a country were to adopt a global cosmopolitan social 
welfare function, including all world citizens, then the discussion above would need 
to be modified, but governments do not frame their objectives in this way.  In part this 
is because of the limited sphere of control of national governments.  The government 
of a country can seek to influence the governments of other countries, and their 
citizens, but it has no direct control.  In some respects, the effect is similar to that of 
political or second-best constraints on social welfare maximisation within a country. 
In his paper on “control areas”, Sen described the planner as “part of a political 
machinery and [as] constrained by a complex structure within which he has to 
operate” (1972, page 486). As I have argued elsewhere (1995), one has to combine 
welfare economics and political economy.  
 
The notion of sphere of control has however wider implications. It does not 
just impose constraints on the achievement of maximum social welfare, but enters 
                                                 
8 I restrict attention to summation, as I do not want to enter the difficulties that arise when we consider 
the distribution of Ui, which would involve comparing the values for people with differing values of λi. 
These difficulties are illustrated by the argument of Dasgupta and Kanbur (2006) that philanthropy may 
exacerbate inequality.     8
into our conception of social welfare. At the individual level, I have argued, potential 
donors can be seen as “framing” the issue in a way that makes sense of, on the one 
hand, their concern for the disadvantaged and, on the other, their capacity to have an 
impact. They understand that there are millions of potential recipients and that the 
contribution of one single donor to the resolution of the global problem is of 
infinitesimal importance, but they also see that their individual contribution can 
change the life of a representative individual. Suppose that we apply the same 
reasoning to action by governments.  The UK alone cannot resolve the issue of world 
development. It is not infinitesimal, but it is only some 6½ per cent of the population 
of the countries that currently belong to the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC), which totals some 960 million. It seems reasonable for a country 
to shoulder its proportionate share: i.e. to represent its concern by the appropriate 
fraction (in the UK case 6½ per cent) of the total problem. Since the estimated 
number of people living below the MDG target level is 986 million (World Bank, 
2007, page 65), this would mean – in round terms - each person in a DAC donor 
country “taking responsibility” for 1 disadvantaged person.  
 
In this way, we may arrive at a position between, to borrow Edgeworth’s 
phraseology, the frozen pole of national egoism and the tropical expanse of global 
cosmopolitanism. A country adopting such a position is retreating from the latter in 
three ways: (a) considering only the disadvantaged, (b) attaching a weight λ less than 
1, and (c) considering only a share of the total proportionate to the country’s potential 
contribution. But it would still be a more generous position than the frozen pole. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
  This paper has been concerned with the two-way interaction between 
individual altruism and social welfare, using this interaction to probe the foundations 
of welfare economics. While giving for development is only a small part of the 
economy of rich countries, it is one of the few direct ways in which individuals reveal 
information relevant to the properties of the social welfare function to be applied to 
global redistribution. I have suggested that, while considerations of warm glow or 
public goods may apply to other forms of giving, the motives for giving for 
development are better seen in terms of the impact on a group of representative 
recipients. 
 
  From this, I have drawn the following main conclusions: 
 
•  If the motives for giving for development are framed in terms of concern with 
the situation of representative disadvantaged recipients, then it is quite 
possible that this concern is non-welfarist in form; the concern may be multi-
dimensional, and may invoke the concept of capabilities. 
•  These individual concerns for the disadvantaged cannot be totally ignored 
when formulating the social welfare function. 
•  If individuals evaluate the outcome of giving in a non-welfarist manner, then 
these should enter the social welfare function; if individuals are concerned 
with development in terms of capabilities, then we have to consider why we 
are evaluating the performance of our own society in a different way.   9
•  The concept of a “representative” recipient for the individual donor has a 
parallel at the level of the national social welfare function, suggesting how we 
can derive a formulation that lies between the extremes of national egoism 
and global cosmopolitanism.   10
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